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JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction over this appeal by LaSal Oil 
Company, Inc. ("LaSal") pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) 
on the basis that it is a case transferred to the Court of Appeals 
from the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court had 
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3) (J) on the basis that the order from which LaSal seeks relief 
was certified as a final order pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
IS8UES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Trial Court Err When it Held that the Term "Sudden" in 
the Exception to the Pollution Exclusion Found in Omaha 
Indemnity's Comprehensive General Liability Policy is 
Unambiguous? 
Standard of Review 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in 
pertinent part as follows: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
In Fashion Place Investment, Ltd. v. Salt Lake County, 
776 P.2d 941 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the Utah Court of Appeals 
enunciated the standard when the trial court has granted a motion 
for summary judgment: 
Because summary judgment is granted as a 
matter of law, we review the trial courts 
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conclusions of law for correctness. Id. If a 
trial court interprets a contract as a matter 
of law, that interpretation is not afforded 
any particular deference on appeal. Power 
Sys. & Controls. Inc. v. Keith's Elec. Constr. 
Co. . 765 P.2d 5, 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
[I]f the contract is ambiguous, but the case 
is decided on summary judgment, we can affirm 
only if the undisputed material facts, 
concerning the parties' intent, demonstrate 
the successful litigant's position is correct 
as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
I<1. at 943. See also, Stevenson v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 827 
P. 2d 973, 976 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (the trial court's 
interpretation of an insurance contract is reviewed under a 
correctness standard); Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co., 821 P.2d 458, 460 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (the appellate court reviews the trial court's 
conclusions of law for correctness, including its conclusions that 
there are no material fact issues). 
As set forth in Home Savings & Loan v. Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co., 817 P.2d 341, 347 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), ,f[t]he 
interpretation of a contract normally presents a question of law.11 
Interpretation of an insurance contract by the district court is 
given no particular deference on appeal. 
2. Assuming, Arguendo, That "Sudden" is Unambiguous and Has a 
Temporal Aspect of Abruptness, Did the Court Nevertheless Err 
in Holding That the Release of Gasoline From Plaintiff's 
Underground Line Was Not "Sudden"? 
Standard of Review 
An appellate court, in reviewing a summary judgment, 
analyzes the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to 
the losing party. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 
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229 (Utah 1987). As stated in Hunt v. ESI Engineering. Inc.. 808 
P.2d 1137, 1139 (Utah Ct. App. 1991): 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when no 
genuine issue of material fact exists and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.... The facts and inferences to 
be drawn therefrom are viewed in the light 
most favorable to the losing party and are 
affirmed only where it appears that there is 
no genuine dispute as to any material issues 
of fact, or where, even according to the facts 
as contended by the losing party, the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. (Citations omitted.) 
See also, Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta. Inc., 814 P.2d 623, 623-34 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in 
the Trial Court. 
This is a declaratory judgment action filed by LaSal 
against nine insurance companies which provided comprehensive 
general liability and excess liability coverage for a service 
station owned and operated by LaSal in Moab, Utah (the "LaSal 
Station"). The insurance policies provided coverage for the period 
from April 1, 1975 through March 8, 1986. LaSal requested the 
court to declare that the defendant insurers had a duty to defend 
LaSal in three underlying actions (the "Underlying Actions")1 and 
1
 The underlying actions are: 
Arthur Ross, et al. v. LaSal Oil Co., et al.. Civil No. 5660, 
Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Grand County, State of 
Utah ("Ross"); 
Hartford Leasing Corp. v. LaSal Oil, et al.. Civil No. 5692, 
Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Grand County, State of 
Utah ("Hartford"); and 
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to indemnify LaSal for any judgment or settlement arising out of 
claims in those three actions. In the Underlying Actions, the 
plaintiffs and the State of Utah alleged that LaSal, among others, 
had released gasoline from underground storage tanks and/or lines 
and had thereby caused property damage and bodily injury. The Utah 
Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association (the "Guaranty 
Association") was added as a defendant because two of the insurers, 
Midland Insurance Company ("Midland") and Carriers Insurance 
Company ("Carriers"), declared insolvency and were, accordingly, 
insured by the Guaranty Association pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
31A-28-20 et seq. 
On September 10, 1990, LaSal filed a Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment against three of the defendants—Omaha Indemnity 
("Omaha"), Travelers Insurance Company ("Travelers") and Allianz 
Insurance Company ("Allianz")—requesting that the court declare 
that these three primary carriers had a duty to defend LaSal in the 
Underlying Actions (R. 491-495). Defendants Travelers, Allianz and 
Omaha filed cross-motions for summary judgment requesting the court 
to declare that these three insurers had no liability under their 
policies and, accordingly, no duty to defend or indemnify LaSal. 
At a hearing before the district court on May 17, 1991 
(R. 3046-3194), the court expressed concern as to whether it could 
rule on the issues of the insurers' duties to defend and indemnify 
when so little was known regarding the timing of the initial 
In the Matter of LaSal Oil Co., etaL, Civil No. 90-039-OHI, 
and the Order to Abate, No. 8712456 issued in accordance thereto 
(the "State Action"). 
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release of gasoline from the underground line at the LaSal Station. 
Accordingly, the court ordered that additional discovery be 
undertaken regarding (1) the timing of the initial release of 
gasoline from the underground line and (2) the timing of the 
property damage/personal injuries in the Underlying Actions. As 
part of this discovery, LaSal asked its hydrogeologic consultant, 
EarthFax Engineering, Inc. ("EarthFax") to review the available 
data on the hydrocarbon contamination in Moab and to estimate the 
date when the discharge from the underground line began—assuming 
for the purposes of this analysis only—that all hydrocarbon 
contamination in Moab was derived solely from the leak at the LaSal 
Station and not from other potentially responsible parties. In 
addition to reviewing the existing data, EarthFax undertook 
additional sampling in Moab to aid in its analysis. EarthFax set 
forth its analysis and conclusions regarding the timing of the 
hydrocarbon release at the LaSal Station in a report entitled 
"Potential Timing of Hydrocarbon Leakage at LaSal Oil Company," 
dated October 31, 1991 (the "1991 EarthFax Report") (R. 1640-
1663).2 
Based upon the 1991 EarthFax Report, gasoline from the 
LaSal Station would have initially been released into the 
environment between February, 1983 and September, 1984. 
2
 In addition to the report, affidavits of Richard B. White, 
the principle investigator at EarthFax who oversaw the work 
conducted by EarthFax for LaSal in Moab, and the affidavit of Lonn 
P. Hamp, the EarthFax hydrogeologist who authored the 1991 EarthFax 
Report and who undertook the calculations found therein, were 
submitted to the court (R. 1664-1671 and 1673-1679, respectively). 
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Accordingly, damage to the environment in the form of gasoline 
pollution of the State's soils and groundwater resources would have 
first occurred within the Midland, Carriers or Omaha Policy 
periods. LaSal argued that the court should, accordingly, hold 
that Midland, Carriers and Omaha had a duty to defend LaSal in the 
State Action. 
The 1991 EarthFax Report also estimated that contaminants 
would have arrived at the southern boundary of the Ross plaintiffs7 
residential properties no sooner than July, 1986. Any property 
damage or bodily injury would have occurred after that date and, as 
a result, would have occurred after the primary carriers' policy 
periods. Based on the EarthFax estimates LaSal conceded that none 
of the primary insurers, including Omaha or Carriers, owed a duty 
to defend LaSal in Ross (R. 1634-1635). 
On the basis of the 1991 EarthFax Report, LaSal further 
argued that if the Hartford Leasing property were contaminated 
solely by a gasoline release from the LaSal Station, contaminants 
would have arrived at the Hartford Leasing property some time 
between approximately October-November, 1984 and July, 1986 (R. 
1635-1636). As a result, contamination of the Hartford Leasing 
property occurred some time during the Carriers or the Omaha Policy 
periods. Accordingly, LaSal asked the court to hold that Carriers 
and Omaha had a duty to defend LaSal in the Hartford action. 
After hearings held on March 23, 1992 and October 20, 
1992, the court granted Travelers' and Allianz' Motions for Summary 
Judgment against LaSal on the basis that there was no evidence 
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establishing the possibility of an "occurrence," as defined in the 
Travelers and Allianz policies, during the Travelers or Allianz 
Policy periods. Pursuant to such ruling, Travelers and Allianz 
were dismissed with prejudice from the lawsuit (R. 1881-1883). 
LaSal does not appeal the ruling dismissing Travelers and Allianz. 
An evidentiary hearing was held before the district court 
on December 17, 1992 wherein LaSal and Omaha presented expert 
testimony to assist the court in determining whether the holes in 
the underground gasoline line at the LaSal Station resulted in a 
"sudden" discharge of gasoline (R. 3195-3320). The Omaha Policy 
excludes coverage for pollution, except where the discharge or 
release is "sudden and accidental." 
In a Memorandum Decision filed on January 21, 1993 (R. 
1886-1893) , the district court ruled that the term "sudden" was not 
ambiguous and that the release of gasoline at the LaSal Station was 
not "sudden" within the meaning of the pollution exclusion. 
Accordingly, the district court determined that no coverage was 
afforded LaSal under the Omaha Policy. In addition to the 
Memorandum Decision, the district court filed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on February 11, 1993 (R. 1894-1903), together 
with a Judgment (R. 1904-1906) in favor of Omaha, holding that 
Omaha had no duty to defend or indemnify LaSal in any of the 
Underlying Actions and that plaintiff's Complaint was dismissed 
with prejudice on the merits. 
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Omaha filed a Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification and 
supporting memorandum on April 9, 1993 (R. 1929-1930 and 1920-
1928) . 
On May 4, 1993, upon the stipulation of counsel (R. 1932-
1935), the district court ordered entry of summary judgment on 
behalf of Chicago Insurance Co. ("Chicago") based upon the fact 
that Chicago was the excess carrier for Omaha and the court having 
found that there was no coverage under the Omaha Policy (R. 193 6-
1939). The Order of Summary Judgment on behalf of Chicago 
incorporated by reference the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment that were previously entered on behalf of Omaha. 
Chicago filed a Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification on May 10, 1993 
(R. 1949-1951). 
In May, 1993, LaSal, the Guaranty Association and Zurich 
Insurance Co. ("Zurich") entered into a Stipulation, Motion and 
Order (R. 1962-1969), based upon the district court's January 20, 
1993 Memorandum Decision (R. 1886-1893), the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R. 1894-1903) , and the Judgment in favor of 
Omaha (R. 1904-1906). The stipulation provided that the Guaranty 
Association was entitled to an Order granting it partial summary 
judgment by reason of the pollution exclusion found in the Carrier 
Policy. The stipulation likewise provided Zurich was entitled to 
an order granting it summary judgment as an excess insurer to the 
Carrier Policy. Based upon the Stipulation, the court granted 
partial summary judgment to the Guaranty Association and summary 
judgment to Zurich. This Order was entered and filed with the 
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clerk of the Third Judicial District Court on May 27, 1993 (R. 
1966-1969). 
Plaintiff LaSal and defendants Omaha, Chicago, the 
Guaranty Association and Zurich entered into a Stipulation, Motion 
and Order stipulating and moving the court for an order certifying 
the three judgments to be final orders and that each of the 
judgments be entered as final orders in accordance with Rule 54(b) 
(R. 1962-1969). The three judgments certified as Rule 54(b) final 
orders are found at R. 1904-1906, 1036-1939, 1958-1961. It is 
these three judgments, certified as Rule 54(b) final orders, from 
which LaSal now appeals. 
This appeal is taken from such part of the underlying 
summary judgments which hold, as a matter of fact and law, that the 
word "sudden," as found in the exception to the pollution 
exclusion, is not ambiguous and has a temporal meaning, that the 
holes in an underground gasoline transmission at the LaSal Station 
did not result in a "sudden and accidental" discharge of gasoline, 
and thus that the discharge or release did not fall within the 
exception to the pollution exclusion found in the Omaha and 
Carriers Policies, and that Omaha and Carriers had no duty to 
defend or indemnify LaSal in the Underlying Actions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. History of Hydrocarbon Contamination. 
1. Since 1977, LaSal has owned the LaSal Station, 
located at 322 South Main, Moab, Utah (R. 1895, 5 1). 
- 9 -
2. In approximately December, 1985, the Utah Department 
of Health, Southeastern Utah Health District, located in Moab, 
began receiving complaints of gasoline fumes in a building located 
to the northwest of the LaSal Station. The tenants of this 
building include Walker Drug, Spencer's Office Supply and a medical 
center (this building is hereinafter referred to as the "Walker 
Drug Building"). By approximately April, 1987, hydrocarbon fumes 
were reported in four private residences located approximately 475 
to 600 feet northwest of the Walker Drug Building. 
3. In January, 1986, Ray Klepzig, President of LaSal, 
learned of the presence of gasoline fumes in and adjacent to the 
Walker Drug Building. Because of the possibility that the gasoline 
fumes might be due to a release from the LaSal Station's 
underground storage tanks and/or lines, LaSal had the lines and 
tanks tested (R. 1896, 5 7; 3216-3217). 
4. As a result of this investigation, five small holes 
were discovered in the coupling threads of an underground gasoline 
transmission line between an underground gasoline storage tank and 
a gasoline dispenser (R. 1896, 1 8 ; 3216-3223).3 LaSal replaced 
all of the lines between the underground storage tanks and the 
3
 The pipe section with the five small holes was admitted as 
Exhibit 1-P at the December 17, 1992 evidentiary hearing. Exhibit 
4-D, also admitted into evidence, is a photograph of the same pipe 
section (R. 1885). 
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dispensers. Since that time, all underground storage tanks and 
lines at the LaSal Station have tested tight.4 
5. The underground gasoline transmission lines at the 
LaSal Station were subjected at all times to pressure of 
approximately 25 pounds per square inch (psi). When the gasoline 
dispensers were activated the gasoline transmission lines were 
subjected to approximately 40-45 psi of pressure (R. 1896; 3215). 
6. State and federal agencies began investigating the 
hydrocarbon contamination in Moab. Preliminary data indicated that 
a hydrocarbon plume contaminating the soils and ground water 
extended from at least the vicinity of the Third South and South 
Main intersection northwest toward the confluence of Pack and Mill 
creeks (R. 2512-2515). 
7. On December 7, 1987, the Utah Division of 
Environmental Health and the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste 
Committee served Orders to Abate on LaSal and Rio Vista Oil Co., 
Ltd. ("Rio Vista") (R. 2189-2194, 3023-3027). Rio Vista owns and 
operates a gasoline station on the southeast corner of the Third 
South and South Main intersection. 
8. The Utah Division of Environmental Health (now, the 
Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ")), in accordance with 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46d-l, et seq.
 f held a formal adjudicative 
hearing in October, 1990 on the Orders to Abate issued to LaSal and 
Rio Vista. The purpose of the hearing, according to the State, was 
4
 A small hole in one of the underground lines, which was 
discovered and promptly repaired in July 1992, is not relevant to 
this action. 
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to uphold the Orders to Abate issued to LaSal and Rio Vista. On 
October 31, 1991, the DEQ issued its Order, concluding that the 
Orders to Abate issued to LaSal and Rio Vista were correct, as a 
matter of law, and should be affirmed. This conclusion was based 
on the DEQ's findings that a release of petroleum products from the 
LaSal and Rio Vista Stations had contributed to contamination of 
soils and ground water in the Moab area. LaSal appealed the order 
issued by the DEQ. On December 18, 1992, the Utah Court of Appeals 
reversed and remanded the order of the DEQ on the basis that the 
DEQ's findings of fact were insufficient to permit meaningful 
appellate review. LaSal Oil Co. , Inc. v. Department of 
Environmental Quality. 843 P.2d 1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
9. On or about March 29, 1988, a civil action was filed 
against LaSal and Rio Vista in the Seventh Judicial District Court 
in and for Grand County, State of Utah, styled Arthur Ross, et al. 
v. LaSal Oil Co., Rio Vista Oil, Ltd. and John Does 1-20, Civil No. 
5660 (R. 2572-2597). The plaintiffs in Ross claimed that gasoline 
fumes from the LaSal and Rio Vista Stations had entered their 
homes. In September, 1992, trial was held in the Seventh Judicial 
District Court for Grand County. The jury apportioned liability 
between LaSal, Rio Vista and a third service station, the Auto Tire 
Service Center. A settlement was entered into between LaSal and 
the plaintiffs after trial, and no judgment was entered against 
LaSal. 
10. On or about June 3, 1988, a second civil action 
styled Hartford Leasing Corp. v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., LaSalle fs±o1 
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Oil Co., State of Utah, Dependable Janitorial Service and John Does 
I-X, Civil No. 5692, was filed against LaSal, among others, in the 
Seventh Judicial District Court of Grand County, State of Utah. 
Plaintiff alleged that petroleum products released by the 
defendants resulted in the infiltration of hydrocarbon vapors into 
the Moab Regional Center, a building owned by plaintiff (R. 2598-
2612). In March, 1993, defendants LaSal and the State of Utah 
filed motions to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint for lack of 
prosecution. Defendant Rio Vista joined the motions filed by the 
State and LaSal. In a ruling filed on June 21, 1993, the district 
court granted defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint 
with prejudice for failure to prosecute. Plaintiff has appealed 
this decision. 
B. The Insurance Policies. 
11. Carriers issued a comprehensive general liability 
("CGL") policy under which LaSal was one of the named insureds, 
Policy No. LP-400088 (the "Carriers Policy"), with a policy period 
from April 1, 1983 to April 1, 1984. The Carriers Policy was 
renewed with coverage extended to April 1, 1985. The Carriers 
Policy was cancelled effective August 6, 1984 (R. 2019-2109). 
12. Carriers was declared insolvent and ordered 
liquidated by the Iowa District Court for Polk County, effective 
January 16, 1986. 
13. Zurich issued a commercial umbrella liability policy 
(the "Zurich Policy") under which LaSal was one of the named 
insureds. The Zurich Policy provided excess coverage above the 
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underlying Carriers Policy. The Zurich Policy is Policy No. CU 
3101-012-00 and has a policy period from April 9, 1984 to April 9, 
1985. The Zurich Policy was cancelled effective July 1, 1984 (R. 
6). 
14. Omaha issued a CGL policy under which LaSal was one 
of the named insureds, Policy No. CL000269 (the "Omaha Policy"), 
with a policy period from July 1, 1984 to July 1, 1985 (R. 1895, f 
2). 
15. Chicago issued a commercial umbrella liability 
policy (the "Chicago Policy") under which LaSal is the named 
insured. The Chicago Policy affords excess coverage above the 
underlying Omaha Policy CL-000269 (R. 460). The Chicago Policy is 
Policy No. 55C-2059706 and has a policy period from July 1, 1984 to 
July 1, 1985 (R. 452-465). 
16. Under the "duty to defend" provision found in the 
Omaha and Carriers Policies, Omaha and Carriers agreed to: 
. . . defend any suit against the insured seeking 
damages on account of such bodily injury or 
property damage, even if any of the allegations of 
the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent, . . . 
(R. 2146, 2023.) 
17. The coverage provision in the Omaha and Carriers 
Policies provides that the insurer: 
. . . will pay on behalf of the insured all sums 
which the insured shall become legally obligated to 
pay as damages because of (a) bodily injury: or (b) 
property damage; to which this insurance applies, 
caused by an occurrence, . . . 
(R. 2146, 2023.) 
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18. The term "occurrence" is defined in the Omaha Policy 
as: 
"Occurrence" means an accident including continuous 
or repeated exposure to conditions, which results 
in bodily injury or property damage neither 
expected nor intended from the stand point of the 
Insured.5 
R. 2128.) 
19. The Omaha Policy defines the term "property damage," 
as: 
"Property damage" means: (1) physical injury to or 
destruction of tangible property which occurs 
during the policy period, including the loss of use 
thereof at any time resulting therefrom; or (2) 
loss of use of tangible property which has not been 
physically injured or destroyed provided such loss 
of use is caused by an occurrence during the policy 
period.6 
(R. 2128.) 
20. The term "bodily injury" is defined in the Omaha 
Policy as: 
"Bodily injury" means bodily injury. sickness or 
disease sustained by any person which occurs during 
the policy period, . . .7 
(R. 2128.) 
21. The Omaha and Carriers Policies contains the 
following exclusion: 
This insurance does not apply: 
(f) to bodily injury or property damage arising 
out of the discharge, disbursal, release or escape 
The Carriers Policy does not define "occurrence." 
The Carriers Policy does not define "property damage." 
The Carriers Policy does not define "bodily injury." 
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of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalies, 
toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials 
or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into 
or upon land, the atmosphere or other water course 
or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply 
if such discharge, disbursal, release or escape is 
sudden and accidental; . . . 
(R. 2146, 2067)(emphasis added). 
22. By letter dated February 21, 1986, LaSal notified 
Omaha of the possible gas leak from LaSal's underground storage 
lines and of potential claims under Omaha's CGL policy (R. 2841-
2842). 
23. In August 1987, Omaha agreed to underwrite certain 
expenses in the investigation of the alleged leak from LaSal's 
underground storage tanks and lines, including retention of 
EarthFax Engineering, Inc. and a drilling company, and retention of 
an accountant to assist LaSal in its review of gasoline 
inventories. Omaha also advised LaSal of certain reservations of 
rights (R. 2858-2859). 
24. On or about June 18, 1987, LaSal filed a notice of 
claim with the Guaranty Association, based on the CGL policy issued 
by Carriers (R. 2850-2851). 
25. By letter dated June 22, 1987, the adjuster for the 
Guaranty Association informed LaSal that the cutoff dates for 
filing claims against Carriers had past and, accordingly, that 
there was nothing the adjuster could do to aid LaSal (R. 2860). 
26. On July 6, 1987, notice of claim was sent by LaSal 
directly to the liquidator for Carriers (R. 2863-2864). Carriers' 
liquidator, by letter dated July 15, 1987, refused to accept 
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LaSal's claim on the basis that the "underground leak" was not 
sudden and accidental and, therefore, that it was excluded under 
the pollution exclusion (R. 2865-2866) . 
27. By letter dated September 3, 1987, Omaha set forth 
its position regarding its coverage obligation and duty to defend 
obligation to LaSal (R. 2867-2868). Omaha, per its agreement and 
under its reservation of rights, paid for certain services 
performed for LaSal by EarthFax Engineering, Inc. and by Zimmerman 
Well Service, Inc. Omaha declined to pay LaSal's total attorneys' 
fees. Rather, Omaha paid one-sixth of LaSal's attorneys' fees or 
$1,275.14, incurred prior to September 3, 1987. 
28. In a letter dated December 28, 1988, counsel for 
LaSal tendered defense of the Underlying Actions to Omaha and the 
other primary carriers (R. 2876-2877). 
29. By letter dated February 3, 1989, Omaha declined 
LaSal's tender of defense (R. 2905-2906). 
30. LaSal received no response from the Guaranty 
Association regarding LaSal's tender of defense. 
C. The Release of Hydrocarbons at the LaSal Station. 
31. The 1991 EarthFax Report concluded that the onset of 
the gasoline release at the LaSal Station occurred between 
February, 1983 and September, 1984. The report further concluded 
that gasoline would have reached the groundwater within a few days 
(R. 1655-1656). 
32. Based on the 1991 EarthFax Report, LaSal asserted, 
for purposes of argument on the cross-motions for summary judgment 
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only, that damage to the environment in the form of hydrocarbon 
pollution of the State's soils and groundwater resources would have 
first occurred between February, 1983 and September, 1984 and, as 
a consequence, fell within the Midland, Carriers and Omaha Policy 
periods (R. 1633-1634). 
33. LaSal asserted that the trial court should, 
therefore, hold that Midland, Carriers and Omaha had a duty to 
defend LaSal in the State Action (R. 1636). 
34. The 1991 EarthFax Report also concluded that 
contaminated groundwater from the LaSal Station would have arrived 
at the southern boundary of the Ross plaintiffs' residential 
properties no sooner than July, 1986. Based on this estimate, 
LaSal conceded that Omaha had no duty to defend LaSal in the Ross 
action (R. 1655-1656; 1898, 1 19). 
35. Based on conclusions in the 1991 EarthFax Report, 
LaSal further asserted that hydrocarbon contaminants would have 
arrived at the Hartford Leasing Property (also known as the Moab 
Regional Center) some time between approximately October-November, 
1984 and July, 1986 (R. 1635-1636). 
36. As a result, LaSal contended that contamination of 
the Hartford Leasing Property occurred some time during the 
Carriers or Omaha Policy periods. LaSal asked the court to hold 
that Carriers and Omaha had a duty to defend LaSal in the Hartford 
Action (R. 1636). 
37. After reading the parties memoranda and other 
submissions, and hearing oral argument on the issues of the duty to 
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defend and the duty to indemnify, the trial court requested that 
LaSal and Omaha present expert testimony at an evidentiary hearing 
to assist the court in deciding whether the five small holes found 
in the underground transmission line on the west side of the LaSal 
Station resulted in a "sudden" discharge of gasoline (R. 1898-1899, 
38. At the evidentiary hearing before the trial court on 
December 17, 1992, LaSal presented testimony through two witnesses, 
Ray Klepzig (the President of LaSal) and Dr. Charles Pitt, a Ph.D. 
in Metallurgy. Omaha presented the testimony of Dr. Franklin Alex, 
also a Ph.D. in Metallurgy (R. 1899, J 21). 
39. After analyzing the section of pipe which contained 
the five small holes, Dr. Pitt drafted a report on his conclusions 
as to whether the discharge of gasoline occurred suddenly. The 
report stated in part: 
In my opinion the openings were caused by a sudden 
failure of the metal at the thread roots. The 
sudden failure was due to over stress of the metal 
from the interior pressure of the liquid gasoline 
in the tank. Corrosion of the pipe wall produced a 
situation where the metal thickness at the thread 
roots was too small to hold the interior pressure. 
At that point in time the thinned metal fractured 
suddenly (due perhaps to a fluctuation of pressure 
in the line) allowing gasoline to flow from the 
opening produced by the metal failure. . . . From 
information given by the station owner the interior 
pressure in the pipe could have been as much as 45 
psi. The resulting calculation gives a metal 
thickness of 1.1 mils at the time of failure. 
Basically what will happen in a failure of this 
type is that the metal will rupture suddenly due to 
the interior stress at the thinnest area of the 
metal. After rupture there may be corrosion at the 
thin edge of the metal to further enlarge the 
openings. 
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R. 1885, Exhibit 3-P. 
40. According to Dr. Pitt/s testimony at the evidentiary 
hearing, the section of pipe he examined was corroded in a number 
of localized areas: 
The corrosion proceeded to continue until at some 
point in time the metal was thin enough to burst 
suddenly from the inside pressure of the pipe. 
. . . 
The corrosion simply thinned the pipe to a point 
where it failed at the thread root. 
R. 3235, 3238-3239. 
41. It was Dr. Pitt's opinion that, prior to the instant 
when the holes in the pipe formed, gasoline was moving through the 
pipe with no leakage. Once a hole appeared in the pipe, there 
would be a release of gasoline to the environment (R. 3237-3239). 
42. In Dr. Pitt's opinion, the failure exhibited on the 
pipe section probably occurred because of an increase in gasoline 
pressure inside the pipe as, for example, when the gasoline pump 
was turned on and the pressure inside the pipe went from 25-30 psi 
to 40-45 psi (R. 3255). 
43. According to Dr. Pitt, the fracture moment, whether 
due to corrosion or some form of external stress, is the same (R. 
3239-3241). 
44. Dr. Alex, Omaha's expert, also analyzed the section 
of pipe. Dr. Alex, like Dr. Pitt, testified that prior to the 
instant when a hole in the pipe formed, the line would hold 
gasoline without leaking, whereas after failure of the pipe it 
would immediately begin to leak: 
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Q: Now, before there was a failure in that piece 
of pipe, before there was a failure, would it 
hold water or gasoline? 
A: Yes, it would. 
Q: And after the failure it wouldn't hold water 
or gasoline, right? 
A: That is correct. 
Q: And it's true, isn't it, that at one point in 
time that piece of pipe would hold gasoline? 
It was a good containment unit, right? 
A: That is correct. 
Q: And at some point in time it wasn't a good 
containment unit, right? 
A: That is correct. 
R. 3289. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The pollution exclusion in the Omaha and Carriers 
Policies contains an exception for any "discharge, disbursal, 
release or escape [which] is sudden and accidental." This Court in 
Gridley Assoc. Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co.. 828 P.2d 524 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992) held that the term "sudden" found in the exception 
to the pollution exclusion is unambiguous and that it has a 
temporal element. Plaintiff requests that this Court reexamine the 
issue as to whether "sudden" is unambiguous. Based on dictionary 
definitions, the history of the exception to the pollution 
exclusion and the scope of the controversy among jurisdictions 
concerning the exception to the pollution exclusion, it is clear 
that the term "sudden" interpreted in conjunction with the term 
- 21 -
"accidental" is reasonably susceptible to more than one 
interpretation, including "unintended or unexpected." Because the 
term is susceptible to more than one interpretation, the term must 
be construed against Omaha and Carriers, and in favor of LaSal 
since the release of gasoline at the LaSal Station was both 
unexpected and unintended. 
In the alternative, assuming that the term "sudden" is 
unambiguous and that it has a temporal aspect, the release of 
gasoline from the LaSal Station was nevertheless "sudden." The 
initial small opening in the underground line at the LaSal Station, 
although caused by corrosive processes, materialized abruptly, 
discharging gasoline immediately into the environment. As this 
Court recognized in Gridley, neither the length of time which 
elapsed between this immediate release and the discovery of the 
release nor the volume of the initial release is relevant as to 
whether the release occurred "suddenly." The cause of the initial 
release or fracture is equally irrelevant as to whether the release 
occurred "suddenly." Accordingly, because the discharge occurred 
abruptly and instantaneously the release falls within the "sudden 




The Pollution Exclusion in the Omaha and Carriers Policies 
is Ambiguous and Should, Therefore, be Construed 
in Favor of LaSal. 
This Court held in Gridley Assoc,, Ltd. v. Transamerica 
Ins. Co. . 828 P.2d 524 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) that the term "sudden" 
found in the exception to the pollution exclusion in a CGL policy 
was unambiguous and that it had a temporal element. The Court 
should, however, reexamine the issue as to whether "sudden" is, in 
fact, unambiguous. Subsequent to this Court's Gridley decision, 
other jurisdictions have found that the term "sudden and 
accidental" is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation 
and, as a result, must be interpreted in favor of coverage for the 
insured. 
It is well established that ambiguities in an insurance 
contract must be resolved against the insurance company as drafter 
of the language in question. Fuller v. Director of Finance, 694 
P.2d 1045 (Utah 1985); Utah Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Orville 
Andrews & Son, 665 P.2d 1308, 1309 (Utah 1983); Williams v. First 
Colony Life Ins. Co., 593 P.2d 534 (Utah 1979). "[I]f an insurance 
policy is ambiguous or uncertain, so that it is fairly susceptible 
of different interpretations, any doubt should be resolved in favor 
of insurance coverage." American Casualty Co. of Redding. Pa. v. 
Eagle Star Ins. Co. Ltd., 568 P.2d 731, 734 (Utah 1977). See also, 
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Dennis, 645 P.2d 672, 674 (Utah 
1982) . 
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The phrase "sudden and accidental11 is not defined in the 
Omaha or Carriers Policies. Likewise, neither the word "sudden" 
nor "accidental" are defined separately. In the absence of a 
definition set forth in an insurance policy, terms in that policy 
are interpreted in light of their ordinary, commonly used meaning. 
Drauahon v. CUNA Mutual Ins. Society, 771 P.2d 1105, 1108 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). Dictionary definitions support the position that 
"sudden" is susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning. The 
primary meaning of "sudden" found in most dictionaries is 
"happening without warning" or "unexpected."8 Dictionary 
definitions are inconsistent, however, with respect to whether the 
term "sudden" does or does not refer to duration; 
8
 Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1988) defines 
"sudden" as: (1) happening or coming unexpected, changing angle or 
character all at once; (2) marked by or manifesting abruptness or 
haste; (3) made or brought about in a short time; an unexpected 
occurrence; emergency. 
The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary 
(1971, reprinted 1981) defines "sudden" as: happening or coming 
without warning or premonition; taking place or appearing all at 
once. In some contexts the implication is rather unexpected, 
unforeseen, unlooked for or not prepared or provided for; (2) of a 
turning, etc.: abrupt, sharp; (3) of physical objects: appearing 
or discovered unexpectedly; (4) made, provided, or formed in a 
short time; (5) prompt in action or effect, producing an immediate 
result; (6) brief, momentary, lasting only a short time. 
The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, (2d 
ed. unabridged 1987) defines "sudden" as: (1) happening, coming, 
made, or done quickly, without warning or unexpectedly: a sudden 
attack; (2) occurring without transition from the previous form, 
state, etc.; abrupt, a sudden turn; (3) impetuous; rash; (4) 
unpremeditated; (5) and unexpected occasion or occurrence. 
See additional definitions in Nancer Ballard and Peter M. 
Manus, Clearing Muddy Waters, Anatomy of the Comprehensive General 
Liability Pollution Exclusion, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 610, n. 11 
(1990). 
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Courts that have not carefully considered the 
temporal nature of "sudden" have confused it with 
brevity and have asserted that an event which does 
not end quickly cannot be sudden. Certainly some 
"sudden" events do end quickly, due to the physical 
properties of the activity, such as a "sudden 
shot." However, a shot into the air could still be 
described as a "sudden shot" although the bullet 
might travel for miles and an indeterminate period 
of time. The dictionaries' various illustrations 
of sudden events are not events that necessarily 
end quickly. For example, Webster's New Twentieth 
Century Dictionary. unabridged, illustrates the 
meaning of sudden with the phrase "sudden 
emergency." A sudden emergency is one which arises 
abruptly and unexpectedly. The duration of the 
emergency is irrelevant to the concept. A "sudden 
need" begins abruptly but need not end quickly. 
Similarly, a "sudden attack," "sudden fear" and 
"sudden resolve" may be of long or short duration. 
Compare a "sudden recognition" of an old schoolmate 
that may continue for one's life time with a 
"sudden explosion" lasting less than a minute, and 
a "sudden heat wave" which could last one day or 
several weeks. In common usage, a "sudden" event 
is one which begins abruptly or without previous 
notice irrespective of whether the duration of that 
event is short or long. 
Nancer Ballard and Peter M. Manus, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 610 (1990) 
(footnotes omitted). 
In Just v. Land Reclamation. Ltd.. 456 N.W.2d 570 (Wis. 
1990), the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the position advanced 
by an insurer which argued that the only meaning for the word 
"sudden" was abrupt or immediate. While acknowledging that "abrupt 
or immediate" was certainly one common meaning, the court pointed 
out that recognized dictionaries provided a range of meanings for 
the term "sudden." Id^ at 573. 
The Just court also relied upon two additional lines of 
reasoning in holding that the word "sudden" was ambiguous. First, 
the court examined the history of the exception to the pollution 
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exclusion in order to determine the intent of the insurance 
industry when it drafted the pollution exclusion at issue in 1973. 
The Just court noted that according to various commentators, "the 
exclusion was designed to decrease claims for losses caused by 
expected or intended pollution by providing an incentive to 
industry to improve its manufacturing and disposal processes, and 
unintentional or unexpected damages would still be covered as an 
'occurrence' under the policy." Id. at 574. The insurance 
industry also represented to state insurance commissioners that the 
new exclusion continued coverage for pollution-caused injuries 
resulting from accidents, but excluded coverage for injuries 
resulting from expected or intended pollution. Id. (See extensive 
discussion of the history of the pollution exclusion in Morton 
Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Americaf 134 N.J. 1, 
629 A.2d 831 (1993). 
Second, the Just court reviewed the scope of the 
controversy among jurisdictions concerning the exception to the 
pollution exclusion. The Just court found that the extensive 
debate over the meaning of the term "sudden" "dispels the insurer's 
contention that the exclusionary language is clear." Id. at 578. 
The court concluded that the term "sudden" was, in fact, ambiguous 
and, therefore, that the pollution exclusion must be interpreted in 
favor of coverage. See also, Allstate Insurance Co. v. Klock Oil 
Company, 73 A.D.2d 486, 426 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1980)("sudden" not 
necessarily limited to an instantaneous happening); Claussen v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. , 259 Ga. 333, 380 S.E.2d 686 (Ga. 1979) 
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("sudden" has more than one reasonable meaning, including 
"unexpected"); Mapco Alaska Petroleum v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co. of 
Omaha, 795 F.Supp. 941 (D. Alaska 1991)("the phrase 'sudden and 
accidental5, as well as having a temporal meaning, can also refer 
to that which occurs without notice"); Queens City Farms, Inc. v. 
Central Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 64 Wash.App. 838, 827 P.2d 1024 
(1992); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 154 
111.2d 90, 607 N.E.2d 1204 (1992); Jov Technologies, Inc. v. 
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 187 W.Va. 742, 421 S.E.2d 493 (W.Va. 
1992); Remington Arms Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 810 F.Supp. 
1406 (D.Del. 1992)(under Connecticut law the term "sudden and 
accidental" was reasonably capable of two widely different 
interpretations); Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 79 Ohio 
App. 3d 183, 607 N.E.2d 28 (1992); New Castle County v. Hartford 
Accident and Indemnity Co., 933 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1991)(the term 
"sudden appears capable of two reasonable interpretations—"abrupt" 
and "unexpected" and, therefore, is ambiguous under Delaware law) ; 
Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 
1991). 
In the case now before this Court, Carriers and Omaha are 
not relieved of their duty to defend or indemnify LaSal on the 
basis of the exception to the pollution exclusion found in each of 
their policies. The "sudden and accidental" language in the 
exception to the pollution exclusion is subject to at least two 
reasonable, alternative interpretations. If the term "sudden" is 
interpreted in conjunction with the term "accidental" to be 
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susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, one of 
which is "unintended or unexpected," there is coverage. There is 
no evidence whatsoever that LaSal either expected or intended that 
one of its underground lines would fracture, thereby releasing 
gasoline into the environment. Indeed, counsel for Omaha 
acknowledged that the release was "accidental," and that LaSal 
neither intended nor expected the release (R. 3143). The 
undisputed testimony of Ray Klepzig, the President of LaSal, is 
that as soon as he suspected that there may have been a release of 
gasoline, he took immediate steps to locate and repair LaSal's 
lines and tanks (R. 3215-3223) . It was in LaSal's best interest to 
assure that no releases of gasoline from its underground thanks and 
lines occurred, and that if any fracture or opening did occur, it 
be stopped as quickly as possible. 
In sum, the exception to the pollution exclusion is 
reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, including 
"unexpected" and "unintended." It must, therefore, be construed 
against Omaha and Carriers, and in favor of LaSal to provide 
coverage for the release of gasoline at the LaSal Station. 
POINT II 
Assuming That the Term "Sudden" Has a Temporal Aspect, 
The Trial Court Nevertheless Erred in Holding That The Release 
of Gasoline From LaSal's Underground Line Was Not "Sudden" 
On January 21, 1993, the trial court issued its 
Memorandum Decision (R. 1886-1893) finding that the leak at the 
LaSal Station "was not the result of a sudden occurrence," and, 
accordingly, that no coverage was afforded LaSal under the Omaha 
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Policy because of the exception to the pollution exclusion. In so 
holding, the trial court relied upon this Court's decision in 
Gridley Assoc, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins* Co., 828 P.2d 524 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992) , as well as the trial court's own experience with 
leaking pipes (R. 3296-3297). In relying on Gridley, the court 
noted that the Gridley court held that, 
"The terms 'sudden and accidental' are unambiguous. 
As commonly used, the meaning of sudden combines 
both elements of without notice or warning and 
quick or brief in time. . . . Sudden connotes a 
'temporal aspect of immediacy, abruptness, 
swiftness, quickness, instantaneous and brevity.'" 
R. 1890, citing Gridley et al. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 
at 527 (quoting U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Morrison Grain Co., 
734 F.Supp. 437, 446 (D.Kan. 1990).9 
The trial court, also following Gridley, properly 
recognized that the length of time which elapses between the 
commencement of a release and the discovery of the release "does 
not render the fracture any less sudden." The trial court also 
recognized that the amount of discharge was irrelevant as to 
whether the discharge was sudden (R. 1891). According to the trial 
court, the only fact distinguishing this case from Gridley is that 
the fracture in the pipe in Gridley was a "clean break," apparently 
caused by ground adjustment, whereas the point of release in 
LaSal/s pipe was caused by corrosion. Because the force(s) which 
9
 Recent Tenth Circuit decisions, Anaconda Minerals Co. v. 
Stoeler Chemical Co., 990 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1993) and Hartford 
Accident & Indemnity Co., 962 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir. 1992), have 
upheld the trial court's determination that under Utah law "sudden" 
is unambiguous and has a temporal aspect. Both cases involved 
continuous, routine discharges of pollutants on industrial sites. 
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caused the fracture in the Gridley pipe were different from those 
which caused the fracture in LaSal's pipe, the trial court 
concluded that the discharge of gasoline from the underground 
transmission line at the LaSal Station was not "sudden," According 
to the trial court, "[t]he convincing evidence is that a leak 
caused by corrosion is not sudden and accidental." (R. 1891). 
This perceived distinction is based on dicta in Gridley wherein the 
Court noted that there was, 
[n]o evidence . . . that the break was caused by 
corrosion or deterioration which would have 
resulted in a gradual drip or trickle of gasoline 
from the line. The clean break certainly resulted 
in an unexpected as well as an immediate and abrupt 
flow of gasoline from the severed line every time 
the pump was activated. 
Id. at 527. 
A. The Volume of Pollutants Released and the Length of Time 
Between the Onset of a Release and Its Discovery Are 
Irrelevant as to Whether a Release Is "Sudden". 
In Gridleyf this Court adopted the position that 
"'sudden' has a plain, unambiguous meaning. While the word sudden 
connotes a sense of unexpectedness, * sudden' within the 'sudden and 
accidental' clause cannot be defined without reference to a 
temporal element, specifically immediacy, abruptness, and 
quickness." Id. at 527 (footnotes omitted). 
The Gridley court's interpretation of the term "sudden" 
as having a temporal element explicitly recognizes that the 
exception to the pollution exclusion merely requires that the 
discharge itself be sudden in order for there to be coverage and, 
as a result, that the length of time which elapses between the 
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initiation of the release and its discovery is irrelevant as to the 
"suddenness" of the release. The term "sudden," however, should 
not be confused with "brevity." As stated by the New Jersey 
Supreme Court in Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of 
America. 134 N.J. 1, 629 A.2d 831 (1993): 
Certainly some "sudden" events do end quickly, due 
to the physical properties of the activity, such as 
a "sudden shot." A sudden emergency is one which 
arises abruptly and unexpectedly. The duration of 
the emergency is irrelevant to the concept. A 
"sudden need" begins abruptly but need not end 
quickly. Similarly, a "sudden attack," "sudden 
fear," and "sudden resolve" may be of long or short 
duration. Compare a "sudden recognition" of an old 
schoolmate that may continue for one's lifetime 
with a "sudden explosion" lasting less than a 
minute and a "sudden heat wave" which could last 
one day or several weeks. In common usage, a 
"sudden" event is one which begins abruptly or 
without previous notice, irrespective of whether 
the duration of that event is short or long. 
Id. at 871-872, citing N. Ballard and P. Manus, Clearing Muddy 
Waters: Anatomy of the Comprehensive General Liability Pollution 
Exclusion, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 610 (1990). 
Other jurisdictions have also recognized that the term 
"sudden" refers to the initial release of pollutants and not to the 
duration of the release. In Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co., 259 Ga. 333, 380 S.E.2d 686 (1979), the court recognized that 
various definitions of "sudden" include both "abrupt" and "coming 
or occurring unexpectedly." The court stated, 
On reflection one realizes that, even in the 
popular usage, "sudden" does not usually describe 
the duration of an event, but rather its 
unexpectedness: a sudden storm, a sudden turn in 
the road, sudden death. Even when used to describe 
the onset of an event, the word has an elastic 
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temporal connotation that varies with expectations: 
Suddenly, it's spring. 
Id. at 688. Thus, the Claussen court held that under common usage, 
"sudden" has a temporal element of abrupt or unexpected onset, but 
did not necessarily mean brevity. 
Similarly, in Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. 
Belleville Industries. Inc., 407 Mass. 675, 555 N.E.2d 568 (Mass. 
1990), cert, denied, U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 969 (1992), the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered a certified 
question from the United States District Court regarding the proper 
interpretation of the "sudden and accidental" exception to the 
pollution exclusion clause of a CGL policy. The Lumbermens court, 
in holding that the term "sudden" had a temporal element, reasoned 
that the sudden event to which the exception to the pollution 
exclusion applied was the release of pollutants, and not to the 
cause of the release or the damage caused by the release. Id. at 
571. "Surely, the abruptness of the commencement of the release or 
discharge of the pollutant is the crucial element." Id. at 572. 
In Wagner v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co., 145 Wis.2d 
609, 427 N.W.2d 854 (Wis.Ct.App. 1988); overruled on other grounds, 
Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd. , 155 Wis.2d 737, 456 N.W.2d 570 
(Wis. 1990) , the court found that a release of gasoline from an 
underground storage tank was both temporally sudden and accidental. 
Although the record did not establish the exact cause of the leak, 
the evidence indicated that it occurred three years before its 
discovery. According to the court, the fact that three years had 
elapsed between the date of the initial release and the discovery 
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of the leak was irrelevant to determining whether the event itself 
was "sudden." The court stated: 
The gasoline began leaking immediately after the 
pipe was damaged in 1981, and continued to leak 
until it was discovered in 1984. Without question 
there was an immediate discharge of gasoline into 
the ground; it just took several years for the 
gasoline to migrate to a point where it could be 
detected. The length of time that elapsed before 
the leak was discovered is irrelevant as to the 
suddenness of the discharge. 
427 N.W.2d at 857. 
The Wagner court also rejected the insurance company's 
position that a pipe which leaked for three years was not "sudden" 
on the basis that if followed to its logical conclusion, the 
argument was unreasonable: 
Milwaukee Mutual admitted at oral argument that 
even were the pipe to be damaged accidentally, only 
the quantity of pollutants released immediately 
following the property damage would meet the 
requirement that the discharge be "sudden." We 
believe that no reasonable distinction can be made 
between an accident that causes an immediate 
discharge of pollutants in great amounts and one 
that creates a leak permitting great amounts of 
pollutants to accumulate over time. Interpreting 
the contract language to make such a distinction 
would place an unreasonable and insurmountable 
burden on an insured. The insured would be forced 
to show that the damage for which he or she is 
liable resulted from the initial discharge as 
opposed to that occurring later in time. We refuse 
to construe the language of an insurance policy to 
effectuate an unreasonable result. 
Id. See also, Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co.. 12 Cal. 
App. 4th 715, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 815, 841-842 (1993) ("' sudden' 
refers to the pollution's commencement and does not require that 
the polluting event terminate quickly or have only a brief 
duration"); Goodman v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.. 412 Mass. 807, 
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593 N.E.2d 233 (1992) (crucial element in determining whether an 
event is "sudden" is the abruptness of the commencement of the 
release of the pollutant); Petr-All Petroleum Corp, v. Fireman's 
Ins. Co,, 593 N.Y.S.2d 693 (N. Y. App.Div. 1993) (leak from a 
subsurface pipe that continues undetected for a period of time is 
both sudden and accidental); Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident 
Ins. Co. of America, 134 N.J. 1, 629 A.2d 831 (N.J. 1993) ("the 
duration of the event—whether it lasts an instant, a week, or a 
month—is not necessarily relevant to whether the inception of the 
event is sudden"). Colonie Motors, Inc. v. Hartford Accident and 
Indemnity Co., 538 N.Y.S.2d 630, 632 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (The 
initial discharge of waste oil from a containment tank was "sudden 
and accidental." "The fact that the discharge was not readily 
discoverable and, thus, continued for a period of time, through no 
fault of the insured, should not move an otherwise covered 
occurrence within the rather shadowy perimeter of the exclusion.") 
Because the length of time that the release remains 
undetected is irrelevant, it follows that the volume of pollutants 
which escapes into the environment during the period when the 
release remains undetected is equally irrelevant to the 
"suddenness" of the release. Wagner v. Milwaukee Mutual Ins. Co., 
427 N.W.2d 854 (Wis.Ct.App. 1988), overruled on other grounds; Just 
v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 155 Wis.2d 737, 456 N.W.2d 570 (Wis. 
1990). Hence, Judge Rokich in the instant case properly found that 
"the amount of discharge does not render the fracture any less 
sudden." (R. 1891.) 
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This Court recognized in Gridley that the amount of 
pollutants which escape prior to detection is irrelevant to the 
suddenness of the release, stating: 
For instance, if an accident causes a break in a 
very large oil line in a remote area which spills 
large amounts of oil onto the ground, the fact that 
the oil spill remains undetected for a period of 
time does not render the discharge of oil any less 
"sudden." Accordingly, in the case at bar, where 
there was damage to a line which caused an 
immediate spill of gasoline into the ground that 
remained undiscovered by Gridley for some months, 
the discharge itself was still "sudden" as 
contemplated by the exception to the pollution 
exclusion. 
Id. at 527-528. 
The exception to the pollution exclusion does not contain 
any reference to volume. If the exception were intended to have a 
volume threshold in order to trigger coverage, then the exception 
should explicitly state that such a threshold must exist. Any 
volume threshold, furthermore, would be impracticable because that 
threshold would have to be tied to specific pollutants. This 
necessarily follows for the reason that certain pollutants, even in 
minute quantities, may disperse rapidly, causing immediate bodily 
injury or property damage, whereas other pollutants may require 
significant volumes before bodily injury or property damages occur. 
In addition, to hold that the volume of pollutants 
released is relevant to determining whether the release was "sudden 
and accidental" would lead to anomalous results. For example, 
suppose that two insureds each releases the same amount of 
pollutants into the ground. The first insured, in the few moments 
after a large rupture of his underground tank or line, discharges 
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hundreds of gallons of pollutants into the ground and continues to 
do so at a lesser rate for a period of months or years. Assume, on 
the other hand, that the second insured has a very small hole in an 
underground tank or pipe which releases only one gallon of 
pollutants during the first moment and continues to release 
pollutants at that same rate for a period of years, so that the 
volume of pollutants released by the first insured with the large 
rupture is the same as that released by the second insured with the 
small hole. If the volume of release were relevant to whether the 
release was "sudden," the first insured would have insurance 
coverage under the exception to the pollution exclusion whereas the 
second insured with the small fracture would have no coverage, 
despite the fact that each insured releases the same amount of 
pollutants to the environment. Furthermore, to require that an 
insured be able to quantify the initial release in order to fall 
within the exception to the pollution exclusion places an 
insurmountable burden on the insured. In the vast majority of 
cases, the measurement of volume of pollutants at the initial 
release would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine. 
The Gridley court, in holding that the break in the line 
at issue resulted in a "sudden and accidental" release to the 
environment, relied in part upon the reasoning found in Wagner v. 
Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co. . 145 Wis.2d 609, 427 N.W.2d 854 
(Wis.Ct.App. 1988), overruled on other grounds, Just v. Land 
Reclamation. Ltd., 155 Wis.2d 737, 456 N.W.2d 570 (Wis. 1990). 
Gridley quotes Wagner with approval as standing the for proposition 
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that, " [t]he length of time that elapsed before the leak was 
discovered is irrelevant as to the suddenness of the discharge." 
Gridley Assoc., Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 828 P.2d at 527. 
The Wagner court further concluded that, "[w]e believe . . . no 
reasonable distinction can be made between an accident that causes 
an immediate discharge of pollutants in great amounts and one that 
creates a leak permitting a great amount of pollutants to 
accumulate over time." Wagner v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co.. 
427 N.W.2d at 857. Thus it follows, both from the reasoning in 
Wagner and from the hypothetical example in Gridley, that neither 
the volume released nor the length of time which elapses before 
discovery of the release are relevant to the suddenness of the 
release. The only logical conclusion that may be drawn is that the 
amount of the initial release, that is, the amount of pollutants 
released in the first moment when the containment vessel is 
breached, must also be irrelevant as to whether a discharge is 
"sudden and accidental." 
The trial court in the instant case properly recognized 
that neither the volume of pollutants released nor the amount of 
time which passed before detection of the release were relevant to 
whether there was a "sudden and accidental" release of pollutants 
(R. 1891). This Court should affirm the trial court's finding that 
neither the volume of gasoline released at the LaSal Station nor 
the length of time which transpired between initiation of the 
release and its discovery are relevant to determining whether the 
release was "sudden and accidental." 
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B. The Fact That the Release From LaSal's Underground Line 
was Due to Corrosion Is Irrelevant as to Whether The 
Release Was "Sudden." 
The trial court below distinguished Gridley on the basis 
that the break at issue in Gridley was a "clean break" whereas 
LaSal's break was due to corrosion. "The convincing evidence is 
that a leak caused by corrosion is not sudden and accidental." (R. 
1891.) The perceived factual difference between Gridley and the 
case now before this Court is, for purposes of interpreting "sudden 
and accidental/1 a distinction without meaning. The only event 
which need be sudden in order to fall within the exception to the 
pollution exclusion is the initial release. The exception to the 
pollution exclusion does not require that the cause of the release 
be sudden. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Belleville 
Industries. Inc.. 407 Mass 675, 555 N.E.2d 568 (1990), cert, denied 
U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 969 (1992) (the exception to the pollution 
exclusion applies to the release of pollutants, not to the cause of 
the release). In fact, the exception is silent as to cause. If 
Omaha and Carriers wished to exclude releases due to corrosion they 
could easily have done so. Corrosion exclusions are commonplace in 
certain types of insurance policies10 and could have been inserted 
in the exception to the pollution exclusion found in LaSal's CGL 
policies had Omaha and Carriers intended to except sudden and 
accidental discharges due to corrosion. 
10
 See, e.g.. Arkwricrht-Boston Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co. 
v. Wausau Paper Mills Co.. 818 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1987). 
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Judicial construction of the phrase "sudden and 
accidental" in the context of other types of insurance policies, 
such as, boiler and machinery policies, supports the proposition 
that "sudden" does not refer to the cause of the release. In 
Anderson & Middleton Lumber Co, v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co,, 
53 Wash.2d 404, 333 P.2d 938 (1959), for example, the boiler and 
machinery policy at issue covered a large band saw. Covered losses 
were defined in the policy as those "occasioned by an accident, 
defined as the sudden and accidental breaking of the band saw 
wheel, or any part thereof, into two or more separate parts while 
it was in use or connected for use." Id. at 939. The saw began to 
vibrate in an abnormal manner, and the insured took it out of 
service. It was only when the wheel to the band saw was removed 
that the insured discovered that one spoke was cracked all the way 
through and another was partially cracked. The insured's expert 
testified that the fracture was a fatigue-type break, attributable 
to a flaw in the original casting. The expert further testified 
that "there was a gradual cracking, extending through three-
quarters of the broken spoke, which must have occurred over a 
period from one to three weeks but that the breaking of the last 
quarter was instantaneous." Id. at 940. The defendant insurance 
company argued that the breaking or cracking was a gradual process 
which extended over an unknown period of time and, therefore, that 
the accident did not occur "suddenly." 
The trial court in Anderson & Middleton Lumber rejected 
the insurer's argument and concluded that the break was "sudden" 
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within the meaning of the policy. The Supreme Court of Washington 
affirmed, noting that there was no indication in the policy that 
the policy was not meant to cover breakage resulting from either 
latent defects or from fatigue. "It is only contended that the 
result, in order to be within the coverage of the policy, must have 
happened instantaneously." Id. at 941. 
Similarly, in Julius Hyman & Co. v. American Motorists 
Ins. Co. . 136 F.Supp 830 (D. Colo. 1955), the insurance policy 
covered "sudden" breaks in machinery and pipes. An opening in a 
boiler pipe appeared instantaneously after gradual internal 
restriction of the pipe occurred over an unknown period of time 
which caused the pipe to split at its weakest point. The court 
found that "[t]he pressure from within, when the strength of the 
pipe so decreased as not to be able to withstand it, split the pipe 
at its weakest point," thereby permitting certain chemicals to 
escape. The court further found that "this involved a sudden and 
accidental tearing asunder of the pipe," and not a gradual process 
that would preclude coverage if the break were not sudden and 
accidental. Id. at 832-833. As noted by the New Jersey Supreme 
Court in Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of 
America, 134 N.J. 1, 629 A.2d 831 (N.J. 1993): 
The most significant aspect of the boiler-and-
machinery policy cases lies in the Washington 
Supreme Court's observation that from the insurers 
standpoint little if any justification existed for 
distinguishing between breaks in machinery that 
occurred instantaneously and those that resulted 
from gradual wear but were undetectable: "it seems 
to us that the risk to the insurer would be the 
same whether a break was instantaneous or began 
with a crack which developed over a period of time 
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until the final cleavage occurred, as long as its 
progress was undetectable." 
Id. at 865, citing Anderson and Middleton Lumber Co. v. Lumbermen's 
Mutual Casualty Co., 53 Wash.2d 404, 333 P.2d 938, 940 (Wash. 
1959). 
In the case now before this Court, there can be little 
question that the release of pollutants from the underground 
transmission line at the LaSal Station was "sudden." The trial 
court's focus on the cause of the release, namely, corrosion, and 
the fact that corrosion is a long-term process was misplaced. By 
concentrating on the process which led to the break in the 
underground line, rather than the release itself, the trial court 
ignored the crucial point that the initial release of gasoline to 
the environment was nevertheless "sudden." The fact that the 
initial release may have involved only small quantities of gasoline 
is, by this Court's and the trial court's reasoning, irrelevant 
because the volume of release is irrelevant to the suddenness of 
the release. Regrettably, the trial court failed to follow its 
reasoning to its logical conclusion; that is, that if the volume of 
release is irrelevant to the suddenness of the release, the fact 
that only minute quantities of gasoline may have been initially 
released is irrelevant to the release's "suddenness." 
As noted, supra pp. 29-30, the trial court's reasoning 
that a release cause by corrosion cannot be sudden was based in 
part on dicta in Gridlev, wherein this Court distinguished between 
the "clean break" in the case before it and a hypothetical break 
due to corrosion. The fractured pipe in Gridley was simpler 
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factually than the facts surrounding LaSal's release of gasoline. 
The Gridlev Court did not directly address the issue of whether a 
release—whether caused by a corrosive process or a more dramatic 
and instantaneous process—has the same result: a sudden or abrupt 
opening in a containment vessel from which there is an immediate 
release of pollutants. The statement in Gridlev regarding 
corrosion could not have been intended by this Court to be the 
final word on whether a corrosive process can lead to a "sudden and 
accidental" release from an underground line. 
In the instant case, the section of LaSal's pipe with the 
five small holes was analyzed by two experts. Dr. Pitt, LaSal's 
expert, stated in his report: 
In my opinion the openings were caused by a sudden 
failure of the metal at the thread roots. The 
sudden failure was due to over stress of the metal 
from the interior pressure of the liquid gasoline 
in the tank. Corrosion of the pipe wall produced a 
situation where the metal thickness at the thread 
roots was too small to hold the interior pressure. 
At that point in time the thinned metal fractured 
suddenly (due perhaps to a fluctuation of pressure 
in the line) allowing gasoline to flow from the 
opening produced by the metal failure. . . . From 
information given by the station owner the interior 
pressure in the pipe could have been as much as 45 
psi. The resulting calculation gives a metal 
thickness of 1.1 mils at the time of failure. 
Basically what will happen in a failure of this 
type is that the metal will rupture suddenly due to 
the interior stress at the thinnest area of the 
metal. After rupture there may be corrosion at the 
thin edge of the metal to further enlarge the 
openings. 
R. 1885, Exhibit 3-P. 
According to Dr. Pitt, the process of corrosion "simply 
thinned the pipe to a point where it failed at the thread root." 
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(R. 3235, 3238-3239.) The failure exhibited on the pipe section 
with the five holes probably occurred because of an increase in 
gasoline pressure as, for example, when the gasoline pump was 
turned on and the pressure inside the transmission pipe went from 
25-30 psi to 40-45 psi (R. 3255). The fracture moment, according 
to Dr. Pitt, whether due to corrosion or to some other process, is 
the same: prior to the instant when the first hole in the pipe 
appeared, gasoline was moving through an intact pipe with no 
leakage. Once the hole appeared in the pipe, gasoline was 
immediately released to the environment (R. 3237-3241). 
Dr. Alex, Omaha's expert, concurred with Dr. Pitt's 
opinion that prior to the instant when the initial hole appeared in 
the pipe, the line held gasoline without leaking whereas after 
failure of the pipe, it immediately began to leak (R. 3289). The 
fact that the initial release may have involved only very small 
quantities of gasoline is irrelevant to the fact that the release, 
when it occurred, occurred suddenly. 
CONCLUSION 
If the term "sudden" is interpreted in conjunction with 
the term "accidental" to be susceptible to more than one reasonable 
interpretation—one of which is "unintended or unexpected"—the 
release of gasoline at the LaSal Station falls within the exception 
to the pollution exclusion. This follows because it is undisputed 
that the release of gasoline was accidental and that LaSal neither 
intended nor expected the release. Because the exception to the 
- 43 
pollution exclusion is reasonably susceptible to more than one 
interpretation, it must be construed against Omaha and Carriers, 
and in favor of LaSal to provide coverage for the release of 
gasoline. 
The release of gasoline at the LaSal Station occurred 
"suddenly." The initial small opening, although caused by 
corrosive processes, materialized abruptly, discharging gasoline 
immediately into the environment. The length of time which elapsed 
between this immediate discharge of gasoline and the discovery of 
the gasoline plume is irrelevant for determining whether the 
polluting event occurred "suddenly." The volume of gasoline 
released is irrelevant as to whether the release occurred 
"suddenly." The process whereby the initial fracture or hole 
appeared is irrelevant as to whether the release occurred 
"suddenly." The critical event, that is, the discharge itself, 
occurred abruptly and instantaneously. Accordingly, coverage 
exists under the Omaha and Carriers Policies. The gasoline release 
falls within the "sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution 
exclusion. This Court should hold that both Omaha and Carriers 
have a duty to defend and to indemnify LaSal in the State Action 
and the Hartford Action. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LaSAL OIL COMPANY, INC., : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
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Defendants. 
An evidentiary hearing was held on December 17, 1992 ,"vto' 
resolve the issues raised by plaintiff's Motion for Partial Sumitiary 
Judgment and the Motion of defendant Omaha Indemnity Company 
(MOmaha,f) for Summary Judgment. The plaintiff was represented by 
Michael Hansen. Omaha was represented by Mark J. Williams. 
The parties submitted memoranda and pertinent cases in support 
of their respective claims, presented expert testimony and orally 
argued the merits of their case. 
The Court has given due consideration to all of the 
information presented to it and is now ready to enter its ruling. 
FACTS 
Plaintiff is a corporation that owned a service station in 
Moab since 1977 which it operated or leased to other parties. 
Sometime in the mid-1970's, property owners and employees in 
the immediate area were complaining of gas fumes. 
LaSAL OIL V. ALLIANZ INS. PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
It was subsequently determined that the gas fumes originated 
from plaintiff's service station. 
Civil actions have been filed against plaintiff, and as a 
result of these actions plaintiff is seeking to compel its 
insurance carriers to defend plaintiff in the civil actions. 
INSURANCE COVERAGE 
Omaha and plaintiff entered into an insurance contract wherein 
Omaha would provide coverage for certain occurrences. 
The insurance policy contained the following exclusionary 
provision: 
This insurance does not apply: 
(f) to bodily injury or property damage arising out of 
the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, 
vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalies, toxic chemicals, 
liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, 
contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the 
atmosphere or other water course or body of water; but 
this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, 
dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental... • 
ISSUI 
Plaintiff contends that the gasoline discharged from its gas 
line was sudden and accidental; therefore Omaha must extend 
coverage for damages that may result from the discharge. 
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Omaha contends that the discharge of gasoline did not result 
from a sudden and accidental discharge, therefore coverage should 
not be extended to plaintiff. 
ANALYSIS 
The Court having read the memoranda and hearing oral argument 
on the issue concluded that in the interest of establishing a basis 
for its decision, the Court should have the benefit of expert 
testimony on when a leak in a small metal pipe is sudden or not 
sudden. 
The Court called to the attention of counsel that it had a 
considerable amount of experience with leaking water pipes caused 
by corrosion and accidents. Prior to becoming a Judge, the Court 
had represented a water company for a number of years and owned 
property where waterline leaks occurred frequently. However, the 
Court's decision is based upon the record made by the respective 
parties. 
Plaintiff and Omaha each presented very well-qualified 
experts to testify on the properties of small metal pipes used for 
the transmission of gasoline from a storage tank to the gas pump. 
The transmission line was comparatively short, but was subjected to 
pressure of 25 psi to 45 psi when in use. 
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Dr. Pitt testified that, "corrosion of the pipe wall produced 
a situation where the metal thickness at the thread roots were too 
small to hold the interior pressure. At a point in time, the thin 
metal fractured suddenly. . . allowing gasoline to flow from the 
opening produced by the metal failure.11 
Omaha's expert witness, Dr. Franklin Alex, testified that 
corrosion caused a penetration of the pipe. Dr. Alex stated that 
corrosion started as soon as the pipe was laid in the ground and 
the process of corrosion was dependent upon the corrosivity.of the 
environment. 
Dr. Alex explained to the Court that the leak that occurred 
in plaintiff's gas line was the result of corrosion which took 
place over a lengthy period of time. Dr. Alex stated that 
corrosive leaks at the inception are minute and generally begin 
with seepage and the amount of liquid that escapes from the line is 
increased as the corrosion progresses. 
The Court is of the opinion that both Dr. Pitt and Dr. Alex 
would agree that in the corrosive process, exclusive of wear and 
tear, it makes no difference if the metal pipe was a conduit for 
fluid, because in due time corrosion will cause the wall of the 
pipe to be penetrated. If there is fluid in the line, the 
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penetration will probably be discovered sooner, but the amount of 
discharge in and of itself doesn't mean that the leak was sudden. 
Dr. Pitt takes the position that any penetration, even if it 
is molecular, is sudden; whereas Dr. Alex claims that a corrosion-
caused leak is not sudden. In order for the Court to resolve the 
issue as to when a penetration is or is not sudden, the Court 
reviewed all of the cases submitted by counsel, and concluded that 
the recent Utah case of Gridley Associates, Ltd. Petroleum 
Management, Inc. and Vernon E. W. Dickman v. Transamerica Insurance 
Company, 828 P.2d 524 (Utah 1992), is the case that best defines 
what constitutes a sudden and accidental discharge. 
Judge Russon, in his opinion stated that, "the terms 'sudden 
and accidental' are unambiguous. As commonly used, the meaning of 
sudden combines both elements of without notice or warning and 
quick or brief in time. . . . Sudden connotes a 'temporal aspect 
of immediacy, abruptness, swiftness, quickness, instantaneous and 
brevity.'M 
Judge Russon went on to state that sudden within the nsudden 
and accidental11 clause cannot be defined without reference to a 
temporal element, specifically, immediacy, abruptness and 
quickness. 
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Omaha argues that the Court should consider the amount of 
discharge from the fractured line and the length of time that has 
elapsed from the time of the leak to the time of discovery in 
making its determination whether the leak was sudden. There is 
some authority for this view, but this Court adopts the position 
taken by Judge Russon that length of time that elapses before the 
leak is discovered or the amount of discharge does not render the 
fracture any less sudden. 
The Court recognizes that the Gridlev case, on the facts, is 
distinguishable from this case. The facts in the Gridlev case are 
such that the only conclusion that could be reached is that the 
break was sudden. In this case, there is the corrosion factor that 
adds another dimension to the analysis of whether the break, 
fracture or leak is sudden. 
The convincing evidence is that a leak caused by corrosion is 
not sudden and accidental. 
Since the leak was not the result of a sudden occurrence, the 
exclusionary provision of the Omaha policy is applicable and 
coverage need not be extended to plaintiff. 
At the time the Court announced its decision from the bench as 
to whether or not the leak in the gas line was not a sudden 
occurrence, it explained to counsel that the Court was not 
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granting a Summary Judgment, but was entering a Judgment in 
conformance with the evidence presented. 
Counsel for Omaha shall prepare Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in accordance with this Decision. 
Dated this <? '0 day of January, 1993. 
JOHN A. ROKICH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LaSal Oil Company, Inc. 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Allianz Insurance Company; 
Carriers Insurance Company; 
Chicago Insurance Company; 
(Interstate Insurance Group); 
Midland Insurance Company; 
Omaha Indemnity (Frank B. 
Hall); Pacific Employers 
Insurance Company (CIGNA); 
Travelers Insurance Company; 
Zurich Insurance Company; 
and Utah Property & Casualty 
Insurance Guaranty Association, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 88 0907028CV 
Judge John A. Rokich 
An evidentiary hearing was held on December 17# 1992, to 
resolve the issues raised by plaintiff LaSal Oil Company, Inc.'s 
("LaSal") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and the Motion of 
Defendant Omaha Indemnity Company ("Omaha") for Summary Judgment. 
LaSal was represented by J. Michael Hansen and Claudia F. Berry. 
Omaha was represented by Mark J. Williams. The parties had 
previously submitted Memoranda, and in conjunction with the 
evidentiary hearing, presented expert testimony and oral argument 
on the merits of the case. Because of such evidentiary hearing, 
the Court, having given due consideration to the pleadings, 
memoranda and testimony presented to it, issues the following 
findings of fact: 
1. LaSal has owned a certain gasoline service station located 
at 322 South Main, Moab, Utah, since 1977 (the MLaSal Station"). 
From 1979 until June 1987, LaSal leased the station to third 
parties. At all other times, LaSal has operated the station. 
2. Omaha issued a comprehensive general liability ("CGL") 
policy of insurance under which LaSal was one of the named 
insureds, policy no. CL000269 (the "Policy"), with a policy period 
from July 1, 1984 to July 1, 1985. 
3. Sometime in the mid-1970s, fumes were detected on a 
sporadic basis in the basement of the First Western National Bank 
Building located on the northwest corner of 300 South and Main 
Street, Moab, Utah, but neither the source nor the type of fumes 
was ascertained. 
4. In approximately September 1982, a substantial leak of 
gasoline occurred at the Stars Service Station owned by Rio Vista 
Oil, Ltd. (the "Stars Station"), which is located east of the LaSal 
property on the southeast corner of the intersection at 300 South 
and Main Street, Moab, Utah. An investigation disclosed a heavily 
corroded underground metal pipe used for transmission of gasoline 
from storage tanks to the gasoline dispensers. 
5. According to expert testimony, the First National Bank 
Building is downgradient from the Stars Station. 
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6. In approximately December 1985, complaints of gasoline 
fumes were received by the Southeastern Utah Health District
 # Moab, 
Utah, from tenants in the Walker Drug-Medical Center building. 
Said building is located to the north of# and across the street 
from, the LaSal Station. 
7. During January, 1986, Ray Klepzig, President of LaSal, was 
notified of gasoline fumes in the area of the LaSal Station and 
undertook an investigation of the underground gasoline tanks and 
lines located on the LaSal Station property. 
8. As a result of the investigation, three holes were 
discovered in the coupling threads of one length of steel pipe 
located on the west side of the LaSal Station. The pipe was used 
for the transmission of gasoline from the underground storage tanks 
to the dispensers at the LaSal Station. 
9. The underground gasoline transmission lines were subjected 
at all times to pressure of approximately 25 pounds per square inch 
("psi"). When the gasoline dispensers were activated the gasoline 
transmission lines were subjected to 40 to 45 psi of pressure. 
10. On or about December 7, 1987, the State of Utah served an 
Order to Abate on LaSal alleging that LaSal was responsible for 
discharging gasoline to the soil and groundwater and requiring, 
inter alia, LaSal to halt the spread of any further gasoline in the 
waters of the state and to submit and initiate a plan of corrective 
action (the "State Action"). 
11. On or about March 29, 1988, a civil action entitled 
Arthur Ross, et al. v. LaSal Oil Co,, et al.. was filed in the 
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Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Grand County, Utah, as 
civil no. 5660 (the "Ross Plaintiffs' Suit"), wherein certain 
homeowners residing northwesterly from the LaSal Station claimed 
that gasoline fumes which originated at the LaSal Station entered 
their homes. 
12. On or about June 3, 1988, the owners of another building 
northwest of the LaSal Station filed a lawsuit entitled Hartford 
Leasing Corp. v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., Lasalle rsic] Oil Company, 
State of Utah, Dependable Janitorial Service and John Does I 
through X, civil no. 5692, filed in the Seventh Judicial District 
Court in and for Grand County, Utah (the "Hartford Suit"). 
13. Thereafter, LaSal tendered to Omaha the defense of the 
State Action, the Ross Plaintiffs' Suit and the Hartford Suit 
(collectively referred to as the "Underlying Actions"), which was 
refused by Omaha. 
14. LaSal filed this declaratory judgment action against 
Omaha and other of its insurers seeking defense costs arising from 
and indemnification against the Underlying Actions. 
15. Omaha filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking a 
determination by this Court that it had no duty under its Policy to 
defend or indemnify LaSal from or against any of the Underlying 
Actions. 
16. LaSal filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking 
an Order that Omaha and the other insurance defendants had a duty 
to pay LaSal's defense costs incurred in the Underlying Actions. 
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17. The Omaha Policy contains the following exclusionary 
provision known as the "pollution exclusion": 
This insurance does not apply: 
(f) to bodily injury or property damage arising out of 
the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, 
vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalies, toxic chemicals, 
liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, 
contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the 
atmosphere or other water course or body of water; but 
this exclusion does net apply if such discharge, 
dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental 
• • • • 
18. Based on an analysis performed by LaSal's consultant in 
a report entitled "Potential Timing of Hydrocarbon Leakage at LaSal 
Oil Company," dated October 31, 1991 (the "EarthFax Report"), LaSal 
asserted for purposes of argument on the cross-motions for summary 
judgment only, that the date of probable onset of the leak from the 
pipe referred to above in paragraph 8 of these Findings was between 
February, 1983 and September, 1984. 
19. The EarthFax Report also stated that, assuming arguendo 
that LaSal had contaminated the groundwater, any migration of 
contaminated groundwater from the leak at the LaSal Station would 
have arrived at the southern boundary of the Ross Plaintiffs' 
residential properties no sooner than July, 1986. Based on this 
estimate, LaSal conceded that Omaha had no duty to defend LaSal in 
the Ross Plaintiffs' Suit. 
20. After reading the parties' memoranda and hearing oral 
argument on the issues of the duty to defend and indemnify, the 
Court requested LaSal and Omaha to present expert testimony at an 
evidentiary hearing to assist the Court in deciding whether the 
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leaks in the underground gasoline line at the LaSal Station were 
"sudden." 
21. An evidentiary hearing was held before this Court on 
December 17, 1992, where LaSal presented testimony through its 
witnesses, Ray Klepzig and Dr. Charles Pitt, a Ph.D. in metallurgy, 
and Omaha presented testimony through its expert, Dr. Franklin 
Alex, also a Ph.D. in metallurgy. 
22. Dr. Pitt, LaSal's expert testified at the evidentiary 
hearing that, 
Corrosion of the pipe wall produced a situation where the 
metal thickness at the thread roots were too small to 
hold the interior pressure. At a point in time, the thin 
metal fractured suddenly . . . allowing gasoline to flow 
from the opening produced by the metal failure. 
23. Omaha's expert, Dr. Franklin Alex, testified at the 
hearing that corrosion had caused the penetration of the pipe. Dr. 
Alex stated that the corrosion started as soon as the pipe was laid 
in the ground and that the process of corrosion was dependent upon 
the corrosivity of the environment. He explained that the leak 
that occurred in plaintiff's gasoline transmission line was the 
result of corrosion which took place over a lengthy period of time. 
He further testified that the corrosive leaks at the inception are 
minute and generally begin with seepage, and that the amounts of 
liquid that escape from the line increase as corrosion progresses. 
24. Dr. Pitt was of the opinion that any penetration of the 
metal pipe, even if it is molecular, as with corrosion, is 
cons idered "sudden.H 
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25. Dr. Alex opined that a corrosion-caused leak is not 
sudden. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the above facts, this Court issues the following 
conclusions of law: 
1. There were property damages that potentially occurred 
within the Omaha Policy period sought in the State Action and the 
Hartford Suit. 
2. There was no "occurrence" within the Omaha Policy period 
arising from the Ross Plaintiffs' Suit. 
3. The costs sought in the Underlying Actions constitute 
"damages" under the Policy. 
4. The Utah Court of Appeals case of Gridley Associates, Ltd. 
v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 828 P.2d 524 (Utah App. 1992), best 
defines what constitutes a "sudden and accidental" discharge in 
analyzing the pollution exclusion of the Policy. 
5. The phrase "sudden and accidental" in the exception to the 
pollution exclusion is unambiguous. 
6. This Court adopts the language of Gridley and recognizes 
that "[a]s commonly used, the meaning of sudden combines both 
elements of without notice or warning and quick or brief in time. 
. • . Sudden connotes a temporal aspect of immediacy, abruptness, 
swiftness, quickness, instantaneous and brevity." Gridley, 828 
P.2d at 527 (quoting USF&G v. Morrison Grain Co.. 734 F.Supp 437, 
446 (D. Kan. 1990) (citation omitted)). 
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7. As established in Gridley, the term "sudden" within the 
"sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion cannot 
be defined without reference to a temporal element, specifically, 
immediacy, abruptness and quickness. Id. at 524. 
8. The length of time that elapses before an underground leak 
in a gasoline transmission line is discovered or the amount of 
discharge does not render an otherwise suddenly fractured line any 
less sudden. 
9. The facts of this case are distinguishable from the facts 
in Gridley because the only conclusion that could be reached in 
Gridley is that the leak was sudden, due to a "clean break." 
10. In this case, the leak in the pipe was caused by 
corrosion, and cannot be considered as sudden. 
11. Because the release or discharge of gasoline from the 
underground gasoline transmission line was not sudden, the 
pollution exclusion contained in the Omaha Policy is applicable. 
Therefore, there is no coverage under the Policy to be extended to 
plaintiff for any of the claims contained in the Underlying 
Actions. 
12. Defendant, Omaha is entitled to a judgment dismissing all 
claims of plaintiff against it in this action. 
DATED this 9 day of /^irkir* , 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
^Av— A ~n<? 
e John A. Rokich 
trict Court Judge 
8 
Approved as to Form: 
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG 
& HANSON 
J. Michael Hansen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
LaSal Oil Company 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
was mailed postage prepaid, on this $*_ day of V/Jf. , 1993, to 
the following: 
J. Michael Hansen, Esq. 
Claudia F. Berry, Esq. 
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Tim Dalton Dunn, Esq. 
Carlton R. Ericson, Esq. 
DUNN & DUNN 
460 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
James J. Cassity, Esq. 
Samuel McVey, Esq. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
60 East South Temple, #1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Kenneth H. Clausen, Esq. 
CLAUSEN & CAMPBELL 
417 South Hill Street 
Los Angeles, California 90013-1122 
Wallace R. Lauchnor, Esq. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
50 South Main, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
9 
